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I. Historical background 
Since the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 the world has changed and 
Europe has changed even more. During centuries the highest authority had been vested in the states. 
International law was a legal system between states in which equals coordinated their policies but which 
contained little law to which the states were subjected. Conflicts between states could be brought before 
the International Court of Justice only when each of the parties to a dispute had expressly accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Supranational organisations did not exist, sovereign powers above the level of 
the state were not accepted.  
 
In 1950 the Western European states agreed upon a binding treaty for the protection of fundamental 
human rights. They accepted that such a treaty could be effective only when a special organ would be 
created for supervision. In line with international law at that time this supervision was attributed to the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, a political organ in which all participating states were 
represented. A special Commission was to look into the cases first and was empowered to establish the 
facts and to try and reach a friendly settlement, but it would not have any power of decision. 
 
The first proposals provided for a right of all individuals within the participating states to lodge 
complaints to that Commission. However, especially the United Kingdom, strongly supported by the 
Netherlands and Greece, objected to such a right of individual petition. This was seen as an infringement 
of national sovereignty because it would mean that the state would no longer be the supreme authority. 
So far it had been generally accepted that persons were subjected to no other authority than that of their 
own states. A possibility of launching complaints concerning their own state to an international body 
was seen as an unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of states. 
 
Both in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands historical research has been made with respect to the 
preparation of the Convention1. This research shows that in both countries considerable opposition 
existed against the Convention as a whole and especially against a right of individual petition and the 
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creation of any kind of a supranational court which was proposed by some delegations to decide on legal 
questions in stead of the Committee of Ministers. 
 
As an illustration I offer you a few quotations from the records. 
 
(1) With respect to the UK2 
The Colonial Secretary stated in July 1950: 
 "The introduction of such a system of appeal to an international authority is likely to 
cause considerable misunderstanding and political unsettlement in many Colonial 
territories. The bulk of the people in most Colonies are still politically immature and the 
essence of good government among such people is respect for one single undivided 
authority which they are taught to recognise as responsible for their affairs. The right of 
petition to an international body would obscure this principle and would suggest to 
Colonial peoples either that the ultimate authority in the affairs of their territory is not 
the Crown or that there is more than one ultimate authority. This confusion would 
undoubtedly be exploited by extremist politicians in the Colonies in order to undermine 
the authority of the Colonial Government concerned. Loyalty would be shaken: 
administration would be made more difficult and agitation more easy." 
 
Now you may expect that a Colonial Secretary takes an extreme position because of his duties. However, 
the Lord Chancellor, who is the highest judicial officer in the United Kingdom, wrote in August 1950, 
that almost all 
 
 "came to the conclusion that we were not prepared to encourage our European friends to 
jeopardise our whole system of law, which we have laboriously built up over the 
centuries, in favour of some half-baked scheme to be administered by some unknown 
court." 
 
In October 1950 the Lord Chancellor wrote: 
 
 "It completely passes the wit of man to guess what results would be arrived at by a 
tribunal composed of elected persons who need not even be lawyers, drawn from 
various European States possessing completely different systems of law, and whose 
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deliberations take place behind closed doors..... Any student of our legal institutions ..... 
must recoil from this document with a feeling of horror.....  
 ..... I cannot view with equanimity a still further appeal to a secret court, composed of 
persons with no legal training, possessing the unfettered right to expound the meaning 
of 17 Articles which may mean anything, or - as I hope - nothing." 
 
The British Cabinet then agreed that the Government should: 
 
 "maintain its opposition to the grant of a right of appeal to a supranational authority." 
 
Once the Convention had entered into force the Lord Chancellor blamed the Foreign Office for accepting 
a text which had "seriously altered the law of this country for the worse". 
 
The situation in the Netherlands was not much better3. The instruction to the Dutch member of the 
Committee of Experts contained drastic restriction of the machinery proposed by the Consultative 
Assembly for the supervision of the Convention. Even the conciliatory task of the Commission should be 
limited "as it could only lead to intervention in the internal affairs of the States concerned and to pressure 
on Governments to take measures to which they are not bound under the Convention". Within the 
Cabinet the Prime Minister especially objected against any possibility of a right of individual petition. 
 
No records have been found of the discussion in other Member States of the Council of Europe. Other 
governments may have been less reluctant. Still, one may wonder how the Convention ever came into 
being against such opposition. One explanation may be that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe had so strongly supported the project. It would also have been inconsistent to object against the 
Convention after the strong support to internationalisation of human rights given by the European 
countries in the United Nations. The British representative in the Committee of Experts wrote to his 
Dutch colleague that he came in a difficult position as he had to avoid any impression that the UK would 
sabotage the Convention4. The opposing delegations succeeded in making both the right of individual 
petition and the jurisdiction of the Court optional. After that success participation became inevitable. In 
October 1950 the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin wrote in a memorandum to the Cabinet: 
 
 "We must sign the Convention of Human Rights, which is the only positive 
achievement of the Council of Europe to date. The compromise reached on this with the 
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Committee of Ministers was agreed in order to attain our adherence, and a retreat on our 
part at this stage would put us in a most embarrassing position."5 
 
It may be submitted that the opposition mentioned above was not against the protection of human rights. 
Both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands take individual rights seriously. Far more it should be 
seen as opposition against international involvement in domestic matters. Traditionally, states had been 
fully sovereign in their internal affairs. Supranationality had not conquered Europe yet. Still in 1957 
when explaining the British position the Foreign Secretary explained: 
 
 "The position which Her Majesty's Government have continuously taken up is that they 
do not recognise the right of individual petition, because they take the view that States 
are the proper subject of international law and if individuals are given rights under 
international treaties effect should be given to those rights through the national law of 
the States concerned."6 
 
Neither could the British Government accept a European Court having jurisdiction over the Convention. 
In the same speech Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd explained: 
 
 "The reason why we do not accept the idea of the compulsory jurisdiction of a European 
Court is because it would mean that British codes of common and statute law would be 
subject to review by an international court. For may years it has been the position of 
successive British Governments that we should not accept that status."7 
 
The Netherlands Government also objected against the right of individual petition and the creation of a 
European Court on the ground that they preferred interstate supervision. In their opinion, the Convention 
was not in the first place meant for the protection of individual interests, but rather to ensure democracy 
in the Member States of the Council of Europe. "This is a political, rather than a legal function"8. 
 
The Dutch Government considered a court premature. In their opinion that did not fit in the stage of 
development in Europe: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4
 Klerk & Van Poelgeest, p. 222. 
5
 C.P. (50) 236, dated 19 October 1950, CAB 129/42 37644, quoted by Lester, p. 53. 
6
 H.L. Deb., Vol. 574, cols. 867-868, July 29, 1957, quoted by Lester, p. 58. 
7
 Idem. 
8
 Klerk & Van Poelgeest, p. 224. 
 5 
 
 "At the present stage all powers should remain in the hands of governments. The 
transfer of powers involved in the establishment of the Court could only be the last 
chapter in European integration"9. 
 
As the right of individual petition as well as the jurisdiction of the Court could only be incorporated in 
the Convention on a optional basis, the general supervision was attributed not to a supranational organ 
but to the intergovernmental Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Commission which 
was to receive complaints with respect to the application of the Convention would have no power of 
decision other than to declare cases inadmissible. When it considered a case admissible it could try to 
achieve a friendly settlement and it could render an opinion to the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe. That Committee would then decide, unless the States concerned had expressly accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
Still, it was expected that the Commission could be of great influence. By declaring too many cases 
admissible it could embarrass the national Governments. The Member States took care to appoint a 
Commission which would have sufficient political experience not to embarrass the States. In the first 
Commission they appointed three legal advisors to ministries of Foreign Affairs, three Members of 
Parliament, three former cabinet ministers and only seven people who had no link to the national 
government (four members of the judiciary, one from the bar, three law professors). 
 
II. Development 
The Commission operated carefully. Of the first 195 complaints 178 were immediately rejected 10. Still, 
several countries were reluctant to accepted the right of individual petition. They feared a stream of 
querulous people or abuse of the right of petition by extremist groups. The Netherlands accepted the 
right of individual petition only after the Commission had rejected the first claims of the German 
communist party. Only then, the Dutch Government was convinced that the Commission would accept 
only serious and justified complaints. 
 
Gradually, the Commission gained confidence and finally all States accepted the right of individual 
petition. 
 
Also the objections against a supranational court generally weakened. The most influential States 
became used to a supranational court in the European Community. Even though the word was banned 
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after the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community, supranationality became accepted in Europe. 
The idea that a court largely composed of foreigners can overrule national laws and national court 
decisions is no longer repulsive.  
 
Most influential was the Costa-ENEL Case in which the Court of Justice held: 
 "By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a 
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law 
which binds both their nationals and themselves."11 
 
The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, when adhering to the Community, expressly accepted the 
case law of the Court of Justice as binding law. The surrender of sovereignty was no longer strange to 
them.  
Gradually, all Member States of the Council of Europe also accepted the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
 
It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom which so strongly resisted the right of individual 
petition and the jurisdiction of the Court accepted both in 1966, whilst France, one of the strongest 
advocates of both clauses, adopted the right of individual petition only fifteen years later, in 1981, after 
having accepted the competence of the Court in 1974. 
 
Since the early years of the Council of Europe the law in Europe has considerably developed. Not only 
are supranational courts and international petitions against one's own Government accepted institutions, 
but also the composition and working habits of the Commission changed. It now operates in the same 
way as a court. Apart from Mr. Ermacora, who is a law professor, a member of parliament and an 
individual expert at the same time, there are no parliamentarians member any more, nor are there legal 
advisors of ministries or former cabinet ministers. The largest present contingent are the law professors, 
eleven of whom are members of the Commission, followed by seven national judges and three members 
of the bar. Two members are Deputy-Attorney-General in their home country, a position which may 
have some link to the government but as a whole the Commission can no longer be seen as an organ with 
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political roots. In practice, the political role of the Committee of Ministers also diminished. Usually it 
confirms the opinion of the Commission. 
 
Time has come to adapt the structure found as a political compromise in 1950 to the possibilities and 
experiences of today. A number of suggestions for amendment have been made. 
 
III. Proposals for change. 
The basic structure of the Convention should be changed. No longer is it acceptable that 90 % of the 
cases is decided by a Commission which is concealed from the public eye. Neither can it be accepted that 
final judicial decisions are taken by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Both rules 
have been weakened in practice. With the permission of the Committee of Ministers the Commission 
publishes most of its important decisions. Important legal questions are referred to the Court and on most 
other questions the Committee of Ministers follows the basically legal decision of the Commission. Still 
virtually all parties to the Convention agree that the system should be changed. Only on the way how to 
change its opinions differ. 
 
A proposal which obtained a great amount of support was the suggestion to transform the Commission 
into a Court of First Instance. Its opinions which are now sent to the Committee of Ministers or to the 
Court could then become judgements. The present Court would then be a court of appeal. The role of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe could be reduced to supervising the compliance of the 
Courts' judgments. No drastic changes in the Convention would be needed but the supervisory structure 
would become more legal. Even though the Committee of Ministers usually follows the opinion of the 
Commission, it occasionally happens that it does not accept that opinion for political reasons. 
 
The question arose, however, whether there would be a need for two instances for judging an application 
which also had been judged by the national judiciary, usually in three instances. Another proposal, 
therefore, was to merge the present Commission and the present Court into one court of human rights. 
This would be faster, cheaper, simpler and more easy to understand for the European people. On the 
other hand two courts would require less change in the present structure and would guarantee a more 
thorough review of the most important cases. When the negotiations on the 11th Protocol started the 
participating states could not agree on either of these alternatives. The dispute between the supporters of 
one court and those of two courts delayed the negotiations for a considerable time.  
 
There were other proposals for change. These were, however, less urgent as they could to a large extent 
be met under the present Convention. 
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(1) The right of individual petition should be made compulsory. This does not require any drastic 
change. In practice all participating states have accepted the right of individual petition and to new 
parties it is made a condition for their adherence. 
 
(2) The same applies to the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. At present 
all parties to the Convention also accept this jurisdiction. 
 
(3) Something should be done to cope with the increasing numbers of participating states. Can a 
Commission and a Court still operate efficiently with more than thirty members? 
Again, practice has adapted to the situation to a large extent. Since 1990 the Commission decides the 
majority of its cases in committees of only three members and most of the remaining ones in chambers 
of 13 members. These committees and chambers are formed in a balanced way in order to obtain a fair 
and equal distribution of the cases and to have at the same time experienced and less experienced 
members deciding. 
The Court has always operated in chambers, but their composition was by lot and therefore at random 
and not always fortunate. Both the chambers of the Commission and those of the Court may relinquish 
jurisdiction to the plenary when they consider a case of great general importance. They quite often do so. 
In 1993 the membership of the Court had increased so far that discussion in the plenary Court became 
too difficult. The Court then created a Grand Chamber of 19 judges to which the smaller chambers can 
relinquish jurisdiction12. Only in exceptional cases may the Grand Chamber relinquish jurisdiction to the 
full Court. 
As increased membership also means an increase in man-power the larger number of members also helps 
in coping with the work. So far it has not caused any great problems. 
 
(4) Related to the increasing number of participating States is the rapid growth of the number of cases 
brought before the Commission. During the first 20 years of the Convention the Commission never 
received more than 400 applications in one year. Thereafter the number grew continuously. The limit of 
1000 cases a year was passed in 1988. Five years later (in 1993) the 2000 mark was passed and most 
likely more than 3000 cases a year will be registered as from 1995 (in 1994 some 2800 cases will be 
registered).  
The Commission adapted its working methods and increased its production accordingly, but its 
adaptation always came later than the increase of the case-load. After more than 1000 cases had in 1988, 
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the Commission managed to decide more than 1000 cases a year later, in 1989. Again, a year after the 
year in which more than 2000 cases were received (1993) the Commission decided more than 2000 cases 
(in 1994). Having received extra staff, a further increase of production may be expected. However, this 
increase always comes later than the increase in applications. Therefore, there is an ever growing 
backlog of cases. By the end of 1994 some 3500 cases were pending before the Commission. Something 
drastic had to be done to cope with this ever increasing backlog. 
 
Therefore it was proposed to create at least one permanent organ, in stead of the Commission and the 
Court which only work part-time. This need strengthened the position of those who wanted one court 
rather than two as the creation of two permanent organs might be too great a burden for the Council of 
Europe. 
 
IV. The 11th Protocol13. 
After long negotiations the 11th Protocol was signed on 11 May 1994. As much as possible all wishes 
for modernization have been met. The right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of the Court were 
made compulsory and a permanent Court will be created. To avoid court sessions with more than thirty 
judges the permanent Court will operate in committees of three and in chambers of seven, following the 
experience of the present Commission.  
Between those who wanted one court and those who wanted a court of appeal as well a compromise was 
reached. As is often the case with compromises this compromise looks worse than either of the 
alternatives. There will be one Court which will normally operate in chambers of seven judges. When a 
case has been decided in a chamber an internal appeal will be possible to a Grand Chamber of seventeen 
judges. This Grand Chamber will be composed of the President, one or two Vice-Presidents, four of five 
presidents of chambers and some ten other judges. 
Governments have the (often mistaken) idea that a court is more supportive of their position if it contains 
a judge of their own nationality. Therefore they provided in the 11th Protocol that the national member 
of the state concerned will sit both in the chamber of seven and in the Grand Chamber handling the 
appeal. As the president of the chamber will also be a member of the Grand Chamber two of the latter's 
members will have judged upon the case before it comes in appeal. At first sight this would be contrary 
to fair proceedings. The human rights institutions have held national rules in breach of Article 6 of the 
Convention if the same judge sat both in first instance and in appeal. The appeal judge can then no 
longer be seen as completely independent and impartial. The drafters of the 11th Protocol held, however, 
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that the Grand Chamber would only continue the discussions of the new Court and should not be seen as 
a new instance. 
 
We may hope that in practice a solution can be found on the basis of the present rules of procedure of the 
Commission (Rule 20) and of the Court (Rule 24). These rules provide that a judge may not sit in a case 
in which he has previously acted as member of a tribunal. On this ground both the president of the 
chamber concerned and the national judge might consistently be exempted. The national judge may then 
be replaced by a judge ad hoc. 
 
Because of the enormous work load the new Court will have to handle many cases at the same time. Use 
of judges ad hoc may then be rather difficult.14  For the Grand Chamber, however, he may be a useful 
substitute for the national member. The Grand Chamber will have three different tasks15. (1) It will 
decide cases in first and only instance when a Chamber has relinquished jurisdiction. (2) In exceptional 
cases it may rule in appeal (Art. 43). (3) It may render advisory opinions at the request of the Committee 
of Ministers16. The need for replacing the national member will arise only under the second of these three 
tasks. As the present Commission will be replaced by the regular Chambers of the Court all decisions 
will in future be Court judgments. It may therefore be expected that less cases will be referred to the 
Grand Chamber than presently cases are referred to the Court. For bringing a case before the Grand 
Chamber leave to appeal is required. According to the 11th Protocol such leave will be granted only in 
exceptional cases. We may therefore expect that the Grand Chamber will meet relatively rarely in its 
capacity of a court of appeal. It might decide to have only three of four sessions a year for which ad hoc 
judges might be required. Such sessions will fully concentrate on a relatively low number of cases. These 
cases will be thoroughly discussed in much the same way as in the present Court. Judges ad hoc may 
then fully participate in much of the session. 
 
Protocol 11 will enter into force when it is ratified by all parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This may take still a considerable amount of time. According to reasonable estimates the 
Protocol may enter into force around 1998. This means that special arrangements should be made with 
the Members of the Commission which will be elected or re-elected in 1996 and with the Members of 
the Court who are to be elected or re-elected in 1995 and 1998. The Members of the Commission elected 
in 1993 (until 1999) and the Members of the Court elected in 1992 (until 2001) were aware of the 
negotiations of the 11th Protocol when they were appointed. In any case no Member of the Commission 
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or of the Court has any vested right to stay for the period for which he was elected. The fixed term of 
office is guaranteed to protect the independence of the persons concerned. No such protection is needed 
when the organ itself is abolished. When they are advised many years ahead of time the office of these 
persons may be terminated at the dissolution of the present Commission and Court. As the new Court 
would be a continuation of the present institutions and in particular of the present Commission, it seems 
desirable that at least a number of present Court Members and Commissioners will be appointed to the 
new Court. 
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